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Abstract—The creation of manipulated multimedia content
involving human characters has reached in the last years
unprecedented realism, calling for automated techniques to
expose synthetically generated faces in images and videos.
This work explores the analysis of spatio-temporal texture
dynamics of the video signal, with the goal of characterizing
and distinguishing real and fake sequences. We propose to
build a binary decision on the joint analysis of multiple temporal
segments and, in contrast to previous approaches, to exploit the
textural dynamics of both the spatial and temporal dimensions.
This is achieved through the use of Local Derivative Patterns
on Three Orthogonal Planes (LDP-TOP), a compact feature
representation known to be an important asset for the detection
of face spoofing attacks.
Experimental analyses on state-of-the-art datasets of manipu-
lated videos show the discriminative power of such descriptors
in separating real and fake sequences, and also identifying
the creation method used. Linear Support Vector Machines
(SVMs) are used which, despite the lower complexity, yield
comparable performance to previously proposed deep models
for fake content detection.
I. Introduction
Being able to ensure and verify the integrity of digital
multimedia content is recognized as an essential challenge
in our society. In the last decade, the field of multimedia
forensics has worked towards developing increasingly effective
technological safeguards to address these issues, with the goal
of inferring information on the acquisition settings and digital
history of the images and videos under investigation.
In parallel, computer graphics and machine vision have
achieved impressive advances in the very last years in the
creation of highly realistic synthetic audio-video content. Con-
vincing digital representations of human characters appear-
ing almost indistinguishable from real people can now be
obtained automatically through increasingly accessible tools.
These technologies are progressing at a tremendous pace,
and can be coupled with advances in the field of text-to-
speech synthesis. While offering exciting opportunities for
entertainment and content creation purposes, it is clear that
such technologies can have significant security implications
in different application scenarios. As a matter of fact, digital
versions of human faces are constantly streamed through video
chats, video conferencing services, media channels, and even
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used for authentication purposes in replacement of traditional
schemes based on fingerprints or passwords.
Thus, the need for forensic techniques able to deal with
this new powerful manipulations has become of primary im-
portance, leading to huge efforts and initiatives in developing
robust forensic detection methodologies and benchmarking
them on common datasets [40], [17]. While the identification
of computer-generated faces has been widely addressed in
the last decade, the data produced by advanced and AI-
based creation tools have raised renovated attention due to the
higher level of hyper-realism [47], as well as new and more
complicated technical challenges. In response, a number of
new detection approaches have been proposed, with special
focus on still images depicting synthetic faces. However, the
problem of detecting fake characters in video sequences has
been faced only very recently, since the quality of AI-generated
videos depicting faces achieved only in the last couple of years
a good level of perceptual quality and realism. Currently, video
forensics approaches developed for this problem mostly apply
detection techniques designed for still images to single frames
of the video sequence, often relying on deep representations
of the pixel domain. However, in doing so they do not exploit
the temporal information provided by video sequences, which
might contain useful statistical characterizations and contribute
to the detection capabilities of an automatic detector.
The analysis of discriminative cues over time is tackled
by a few previous works. One direction is to detect be-
havioural anomalies of the face dynamics, like the absence of
physiological signals [11], inconsistent expression patterns [4],
irregular eye-blinking [27]. While in principle these methods are
robust to geometric degradations and easily interpretable, their
effectiveness is highly dependent on the scene content, as it is
based on few semantic cues that might not be available in all
video sequences. Also, deep learning machinery (like recurrent
neural networks [41], [22], [5]) has very recently been used to
model short frame sequences, showing promising results at
the price of low interpretability, a typical issue of deep learning
based approaches. Moreover, deep learning based techniques
present the classical drawback of requiring careful training on
a large and diverse amount of data to achieve transferability
of results and to avoid overfitting.
In this work, we aim at exploiting both texture and temporal
information of the video sequence, by tackling an intermediate
approach that relies on hybrid descriptors operating in both
spatial and time domain. This yields relatively small feature
representations that can be learned through simpler classifiers,
such as linear SVMs. While such descriptors have been
successfully used for video-based face spoofing detection [43],
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2to the best of our knowledge their effectiveness has never
been explored in the context of manipulated faces detection,
although the two problems present significant analogies. Our
approach employs so-called Local Derivative Patterns on Three
Orthogonal Planes (LDP-TOP), a variant of local binary patterns
that operates on three dimensions and proved to be particularly
effective in face anti-spoofing. Moreover, we propose to perform
the analysis of entire video sequences by combining the
predictions computed on multiple temporal segments, which
proves to bring a significant accuracy gain.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: Section
II summarizes the state of research for the problem of ma-
nipulated video and image faces detection; in Section III, we
illustrate how the feature descriptors are extracted from single
videos, while Section IV describes the proposed classification
framework. Experimental results are reported in Section V and
conclusions are drawn in Section VI.
II. Detection of manipulated faces in images and videos
In order to position our work with respect to existing litera-
ture, this section briefly reviews the main classes of methods
proposed for detecting manipulated and computer-generated
(CG) faces in multimedia data.
A. Methods based on statistical hand-crafted features
Several methods proposed to distinguish real from ma-
nipulated multimedia content by exploiting statistical features
capturing intrinsic properties of the media object. Earlier works
study specific traces that are present in real data due to
operations at acquisition time [33], such as color filter array
interpolation [21], or lens chromatic aberration [15]. Other
approaches extract statistical features capturing the character-
istics of the spatial texture [36] [25] and the coefficients distri-
bution in transformed domains (e.g., wavelet) [29] [9], leading
to supervised classification frameworks combining these cues
[37].
More recently, detectors based on Fourier analysis coupled
with conventional machine learning have been proposed also
for modern AI-based manipulations [16]. Such methods are
applied to images only, thus they do not deal with the temporal
evolution of video signals. As detailed in Section III, our work
fills this gap by proposing a spatio-temporal texture description.
B. Methods based on deep neural networks
Deep neural networks are not only used for creation pur-
poses but also as powerful tools for detecting fake content.
Several studies have been conducted on the use of deep
networks to detect fake images generated by Generative Adver-
sarial Networks (GANs) [31], [53], [30], and identify fingerprint
specific GANs may leave [52].
A number of Convolutional Neural Networks (CNN) architec-
ture have been proposed for the detection of manipulated faces
videos, with the goal of characterizing artifacts arising when
generating fake content. The authors in [39], [3] propose two
shallow CNNs architectures exploiting mesoscopic features.
In [40], it is shown that deeper general-purpose networks
like XceptionNet in the same supervised scenario generally
outperform shallow ones, as well as where re-adapted feature-
based methods originating from steganalysis [20] and general-
purpose image forensics [7].
While these methods are applied individually on video
frames, only few works operate along the temporal dimension.
This is done in [41] and [22] through the use of recurrent neural
networks. In in [5], a CNN is used to estimate and analyze the
optical flow field across frames.
Finally, several deep-learning techniques have been recently
proposed for other security applications, including the analysis
of surveillance videos [49], and the detection of suspect videos
through usage of blockchain and smart contracts [23].
While the mentioned approach deliver good results in su-
pervised scenarios, they typically tend to overfit the training
set and suffer from performance decrease when dealing with
unseen manipulations [26]. Additional strategies are then nec-
essary to increase generalization capabilities, such as attention
mechanisms [44] or segmentation modules [34]. We refer the
reader to [46] [35] for thorough surveys of the literature on the
topic.
C. Methods based on semantic cues
As an alternative to hand-crafted or self-learned features, a
number of methods aims at characterizing semantic features
differentiating real and manipulated content. The work in [32]
extracts typical artifacts appearing in GAN-generated images,
such as non symmetrical colors and shape (in eyes and ears)
or badly rendered details (e.g., blurry teeth areas).
Earlier studies on rendered faces exploited geometric prop-
erties of the face in the spatial [12] and temporal domain
[13]. Further properties like inconsistencies in facial landmark
locations [51], head pose [50], and eye-blinking [28] have also
been exploited for exposing fakes.
By relying on video magnification techniques [48], the tech-
niques developed in [11] and [8] estimate the pulse rate of the
depicted subject from temporal skin color variations, and show
that this physiological signal is typically flat when the subject
face is manipulated or computer generated. Similar ideas are
explored in [10] and [18], where deep networks are used for
this purpose.
Moreover, recent approaches [4] study and characterize soft
traits specific individuals have in reproducing facial expressions
and head movements, which are hardly reproducible in manip-
ulated content.
III. Extraction of spatio-temporal textural features
The methodology proposed in this work is composed of a
preprocessing phase and a feature extraction phase. These two
processes are described in the following subsections. Obtained
feature representation will be learned in the classification phase
described in the next section.
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Fig. 1: Workflow of the proposed pre-processing pipeline.
A. Pre-processing
First, video patches are extracted and partitioned in multiple
temporal sequences1. The different steps involved in the pre-
processing pipeline are depicted in Fig. 1 and explained below:
(a) Face detection and tracking: after extracting the frames,
the Python library dlib (v. 19.8.1) is used on the first
video frame to obtain the ROI patch containing the face,
as well as on every subsequent frame to detect the 68
facial landmarks. The three landmarks corresponding to
the right eye lacrimal caruncle (r), the left eye lacrimal
caruncle (l), and top nose (n) are selected. A motion
vector ∆ is then computed between each pair of con-
secutive frames by averaging the horizontal and vertical
displacements of r, l and n, and smoothed temporally
1Python 3.6.7 with the OpenCV2 4.1.0 libraries and MATLAB R2019a have
been used for the implementation.
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h , w
<latexit sha1_base64="HIgrVEqAYjfEOZCDl1lu f1MFMVs=">AAAB7XicbVDLSgMxFL2pr1pfVZdugkVwoWVGBF0W3AhuKtgHtGPJpJk2NpMMSUYpQ8FPcONC Ebf+jzv/xvSx0OqBC4dz7uXee8JEcGM97wvlFhaXllfyq4W19Y3NreL2Tt2oVFNWo0oo3QyJYYJLVrPcCtZ MNCNxKFgjHFyM/cY904YreWOHCQti0pM84pRYJ9X7t8dH+KFTLHllbwL8l/gzUoIZqp3iZ7uraBozaakgxr R8L7FBRrTlVLBRoZ0alhA6ID3WclSSmJkgm1w7wgdO6eJIaVfS4on6cyIjsTHDOHSdMbF9M++Nxf+8Vmqj 8yDjMkktk3S6KEoFtgqPX8ddrhm1YugIoZq7WzHtE02odQEVXAj+/Mt/Sf2k7Htl//q0VLl6nMaRhz3Yh0P w4QwqcAlVqAGFO3iCF3hFCj2jN/Q+bc2hWYS78Avo4xuuGo71</latexit><latexit sha1_base64="HIgrVEqAYjfEOZCDl1lu f1MFMVs=">AAAB7XicbVDLSgMxFL2pr1pfVZdugkVwoWVGBF0W3AhuKtgHtGPJpJk2NpMMSUYpQ8FPcONC Ebf+jzv/xvSx0OqBC4dz7uXee8JEcGM97wvlFhaXllfyq4W19Y3NreL2Tt2oVFNWo0oo3QyJYYJLVrPcCtZ MNCNxKFgjHFyM/cY904YreWOHCQti0pM84pRYJ9X7t8dH+KFTLHllbwL8l/gzUoIZqp3iZ7uraBozaakgxr R8L7FBRrTlVLBRoZ0alhA6ID3WclSSmJkgm1w7wgdO6eJIaVfS4on6cyIjsTHDOHSdMbF9M++Nxf+8Vmqj 8yDjMkktk3S6KEoFtgqPX8ddrhm1YugIoZq7WzHtE02odQEVXAj+/Mt/Sf2k7Htl//q0VLl6nMaRhz3Yh0P w4QwqcAlVqAGFO3iCF3hFCj2jN/Q+bc2hWYS78Avo4xuuGo71</latexit><latexit sha1_base64="HIgrVEqAYjfEOZCDl1lu f1MFMVs=">AAAB7XicbVDLSgMxFL2pr1pfVZdugkVwoWVGBF0W3AhuKtgHtGPJpJk2NpMMSUYpQ8FPcONC Ebf+jzv/xvSx0OqBC4dz7uXee8JEcGM97wvlFhaXllfyq4W19Y3NreL2Tt2oVFNWo0oo3QyJYYJLVrPcCtZ MNCNxKFgjHFyM/cY904YreWOHCQti0pM84pRYJ9X7t8dH+KFTLHllbwL8l/gzUoIZqp3iZ7uraBozaakgxr R8L7FBRrTlVLBRoZ0alhA6ID3WclSSmJkgm1w7wgdO6eJIaVfS4on6cyIjsTHDOHSdMbF9M++Nxf+8Vmqj 8yDjMkktk3S6KEoFtgqPX8ddrhm1YugIoZq7WzHtE02odQEVXAj+/Mt/Sf2k7Htl//q0VLl6nMaRhz3Yh0P w4QwqcAlVqAGFO3iCF3hFCj2jN/Q+bc2hWYS78Avo4xuuGo71</latexit><latexit sha1_base64="HIgrVEqAYjfEOZCDl1lu f1MFMVs=">AAAB7XicbVDLSgMxFL2pr1pfVZdugkVwoWVGBF0W3AhuKtgHtGPJpJk2NpMMSUYpQ8FPcONC Ebf+jzv/xvSx0OqBC4dz7uXee8JEcGM97wvlFhaXllfyq4W19Y3NreL2Tt2oVFNWo0oo3QyJYYJLVrPcCtZ MNCNxKFgjHFyM/cY904YreWOHCQti0pM84pRYJ9X7t8dH+KFTLHllbwL8l/gzUoIZqp3iZ7uraBozaakgxr R8L7FBRrTlVLBRoZ0alhA6ID3WclSSmJkgm1w7wgdO6eJIaVfS4on6cyIjsTHDOHSdMbF9M++Nxf+8Vmqj 8yDjMkktk3S6KEoFtgqPX8ddrhm1YugIoZq7WzHtE02odQEVXAj+/Mt/Sf2k7Htl//q0VLl6nMaRhz3Yh0P w4QwqcAlVqAGFO3iCF3hFCj2jN/Q+bc2hWYS78Avo4xuuGo71</latexit>
h,w
<latexit sha1_base64="myG4lzjkvRgplAeXaUGl ln7W3Zk=">AAAB63icbVBNS8NAEJ3Ur1q/qh69LBbBg5REBD0WvAheKpi20Iay2W6apbubsLtRSij4C7x4 UMSrf8ib/8ZN24O2Phh4vDfDzLww5Uwb1/12Siura+sb5c3K1vbO7l51/6Clk0wR6pOEJ6oTYk05k9Q3zHD aSRXFIuS0HY6uC7/9QJVmibw345QGAg8lixjBppDiM/TYr9bcujsFWibenNRgjma/+tUbJCQTVBrCsdZdz0 1NkGNlGOF0UullmqaYjPCQdi2VWFAd5NNbJ+jEKgMUJcqWNGiq/p7IsdB6LELbKbCJ9aJXiP953cxEV0HO ZJoZKslsUZRxZBJUPI4GTFFi+NgSTBSztyISY4WJsfFUbAje4svLpHVe99y6d3dRa9w+zeIowxEcwyl4cAk NuIEm+EAghmd4hTdHOC/Ou/Mxay058wgP4Q+czx+Ouo5W</latexit><latexit sha1_base64="myG4lzjkvRgplAeXaUGl ln7W3Zk=">AAAB63icbVBNS8NAEJ3Ur1q/qh69LBbBg5REBD0WvAheKpi20Iay2W6apbubsLtRSij4C7x4 UMSrf8ib/8ZN24O2Phh4vDfDzLww5Uwb1/12Siura+sb5c3K1vbO7l51/6Clk0wR6pOEJ6oTYk05k9Q3zHD aSRXFIuS0HY6uC7/9QJVmibw345QGAg8lixjBppDiM/TYr9bcujsFWibenNRgjma/+tUbJCQTVBrCsdZdz0 1NkGNlGOF0UullmqaYjPCQdi2VWFAd5NNbJ+jEKgMUJcqWNGiq/p7IsdB6LELbKbCJ9aJXiP953cxEV0HO ZJoZKslsUZRxZBJUPI4GTFFi+NgSTBSztyISY4WJsfFUbAje4svLpHVe99y6d3dRa9w+zeIowxEcwyl4cAk NuIEm+EAghmd4hTdHOC/Ou/Mxay058wgP4Q+czx+Ouo5W</latexit><latexit sha1_base64="myG4lzjkvRgplAeXaUGl ln7W3Zk=">AAAB63icbVBNS8NAEJ3Ur1q/qh69LBbBg5REBD0WvAheKpi20Iay2W6apbubsLtRSij4C7x4 UMSrf8ib/8ZN24O2Phh4vDfDzLww5Uwb1/12Siura+sb5c3K1vbO7l51/6Clk0wR6pOEJ6oTYk05k9Q3zHD aSRXFIuS0HY6uC7/9QJVmibw345QGAg8lixjBppDiM/TYr9bcujsFWibenNRgjma/+tUbJCQTVBrCsdZdz0 1NkGNlGOF0UullmqaYjPCQdi2VWFAd5NNbJ+jEKgMUJcqWNGiq/p7IsdB6LELbKbCJ9aJXiP953cxEV0HO ZJoZKslsUZRxZBJUPI4GTFFi+NgSTBSztyISY4WJsfFUbAje4svLpHVe99y6d3dRa9w+zeIowxEcwyl4cAk NuIEm+EAghmd4hTdHOC/Ou/Mxay058wgP4Q+czx+Ouo5W</latexit><latexit sha1_base64="myG4lzjkvRgplAeXaUGl ln7W3Zk=">AAAB63icbVBNS8NAEJ3Ur1q/qh69LBbBg5REBD0WvAheKpi20Iay2W6apbubsLtRSij4C7x4 UMSrf8ib/8ZN24O2Phh4vDfDzLww5Uwb1/12Siura+sb5c3K1vbO7l51/6Clk0wR6pOEJ6oTYk05k9Q3zHD aSRXFIuS0HY6uC7/9QJVmibw345QGAg8lixjBppDiM/TYr9bcujsFWibenNRgjma/+tUbJCQTVBrCsdZdz0 1NkGNlGOF0UullmqaYjPCQdi2VWFAd5NNbJ+jEKgMUJcqWNGiq/p7IsdB6LELbKbCJ9aJXiP953cxEV0HO ZJoZKslsUZRxZBJUPI4GTFFi+NgSTBSztyISY4WJsfFUbAje4svLpHVe99y6d3dRa9w+zeIowxEcwyl4cAk NuIEm+EAghmd4hTdHOC/Ou/Mxay058wgP4Q+czx+Ouo5W</latexit>
h , w 
<latexit sha1_base64="NC0BRR4zT1JagfPg3hag 3K6cAFI=">AAAB73icbVDLSgNBEOz1GeMr6tHLYBA8mLArgh4DXgQvEcwDkk2YncwmQ2Zn15leJYSA3+DF gyJe/R1v/o2Tx0ETCxqKqm66u4JECoOu++0sLa+srq1nNrKbW9s7u7m9/aqJU814hcUy1vWAGi6F4hUUKHk 90ZxGgeS1oH819msPXBsRqzscJNyPaFeJUDCKVqr3WoVT8tgqtHN5t+hOQBaJNyN5mKHczn01OzFLI66QSW pMw3MT9IdUo2CSj7LN1PCEsj7t8oalikbc+MPJvSNybJUOCWNtSyGZqL8nhjQyZhAFtjOi2DPz3lj8z2uk GF76Q6GSFLli00VhKgnGZPw86QjNGcqBJZRpYW8lrEc1ZWgjytoQvPmXF0n1rOi5Re/2PF+6eZrGkYFDOII T8OACSnANZagAAwnP8Apvzr3z4rw7H9PWJWcW4QH8gfP5A859j5Q=</latexit><latexit sha1_base64="NC0BRR4zT1JagfPg3hag 3K6cAFI=">AAAB73icbVDLSgNBEOz1GeMr6tHLYBA8mLArgh4DXgQvEcwDkk2YncwmQ2Zn15leJYSA3+DF gyJe/R1v/o2Tx0ETCxqKqm66u4JECoOu++0sLa+srq1nNrKbW9s7u7m9/aqJU814hcUy1vWAGi6F4hUUKHk 90ZxGgeS1oH819msPXBsRqzscJNyPaFeJUDCKVqr3WoVT8tgqtHN5t+hOQBaJNyN5mKHczn01OzFLI66QSW pMw3MT9IdUo2CSj7LN1PCEsj7t8oalikbc+MPJvSNybJUOCWNtSyGZqL8nhjQyZhAFtjOi2DPz3lj8z2uk GF76Q6GSFLli00VhKgnGZPw86QjNGcqBJZRpYW8lrEc1ZWgjytoQvPmXF0n1rOi5Re/2PF+6eZrGkYFDOII T8OACSnANZagAAwnP8Apvzr3z4rw7H9PWJWcW4QH8gfP5A859j5Q=</latexit><latexit sha1_base64="NC0BRR4zT1JagfPg3hag 3K6cAFI=">AAAB73icbVDLSgNBEOz1GeMr6tHLYBA8mLArgh4DXgQvEcwDkk2YncwmQ2Zn15leJYSA3+DF gyJe/R1v/o2Tx0ETCxqKqm66u4JECoOu++0sLa+srq1nNrKbW9s7u7m9/aqJU814hcUy1vWAGi6F4hUUKHk 90ZxGgeS1oH819msPXBsRqzscJNyPaFeJUDCKVqr3WoVT8tgqtHN5t+hOQBaJNyN5mKHczn01OzFLI66QSW pMw3MT9IdUo2CSj7LN1PCEsj7t8oalikbc+MPJvSNybJUOCWNtSyGZqL8nhjQyZhAFtjOi2DPz3lj8z2uk GF76Q6GSFLli00VhKgnGZPw86QjNGcqBJZRpYW8lrEc1ZWgjytoQvPmXF0n1rOi5Re/2PF+6eZrGkYFDOII T8OACSnANZagAAwnP8Apvzr3z4rw7H9PWJWcW4QH8gfP5A859j5Q=</latexit><latexit sha1_base64="NC0BRR4zT1JagfPg3hag 3K6cAFI=">AAAB73icbVDLSgNBEOz1GeMr6tHLYBA8mLArgh4DXgQvEcwDkk2YncwmQ2Zn15leJYSA3+DF gyJe/R1v/o2Tx0ETCxqKqm66u4JECoOu++0sLa+srq1nNrKbW9s7u7m9/aqJU814hcUy1vWAGi6F4hUUKHk 90ZxGgeS1oH819msPXBsRqzscJNyPaFeJUDCKVqr3WoVT8tgqtHN5t+hOQBaJNyN5mKHczn01OzFLI66QSW pMw3MT9IdUo2CSj7LN1PCEsj7t8oalikbc+MPJvSNybJUOCWNtSyGZqL8nhjQyZhAFtjOi2DPz3lj8z2uk GF76Q6GSFLli00VhKgnGZPw86QjNGcqBJZRpYW8lrEc1ZWgjytoQvPmXF0n1rOi5Re/2PF+6eZrGkYFDOII T8OACSnANZagAAwnP8Apvzr3z4rw7H9PWJWcW4QH8gfP5A859j5Q=</latexit>
h , w+
<latexit sha1_base64="xpl6XVrfMZvjmM458Ptpdn8otuk=">AAAB73icbVDJSgNBEK1xjXGLevTSGAR BDTMi6DHgRfASwSyQjZ5OTdKkp2fs7lHCEPAbvHhQxKu/482/sbMcNPFBweO9Kqrq+bHg2rjut7OwuLS8sppZy65vbG5t53Z2KzpKFMMyi0Skaj7VKLjEsuFGYC1WSENfYNXvX4386gMqzSN5ZwYxNkPalTzgjBor1Xqt 0xPy2Dpu5/JuwR2DzBNvSvIwRamd+2p0IpaEKA0TVOu658ammVJlOBM4zDYSjTFlfdrFuqWShqib6fjeITm0SocEkbIlDRmrvydSGmo9CH3bGVLT07PeSPzPqycmuGymXMaJQckmi4JEEBOR0fOkwxUyIwaWUKa4vZWwH lWUGRtR1obgzb48TypnBc8teLfn+eLN0ySODOzDARyBBxdQhGsoQRkYCHiGV3hz7p0X5935mLQuONMI9+APnM8fy3WPkg==</latexit><latexit sha1_base64="xpl6XVrfMZvjmM458Ptpdn8otuk=">AAAB73icbVDJSgNBEK1xjXGLevTSGAR BDTMi6DHgRfASwSyQjZ5OTdKkp2fs7lHCEPAbvHhQxKu/482/sbMcNPFBweO9Kqrq+bHg2rjut7OwuLS8sppZy65vbG5t53Z2KzpKFMMyi0Skaj7VKLjEsuFGYC1WSENfYNXvX4386gMqzSN5ZwYxNkPalTzgjBor1Xqt 0xPy2Dpu5/JuwR2DzBNvSvIwRamd+2p0IpaEKA0TVOu658ammVJlOBM4zDYSjTFlfdrFuqWShqib6fjeITm0SocEkbIlDRmrvydSGmo9CH3bGVLT07PeSPzPqycmuGymXMaJQckmi4JEEBOR0fOkwxUyIwaWUKa4vZWwH lWUGRtR1obgzb48TypnBc8teLfn+eLN0ySODOzDARyBBxdQhGsoQRkYCHiGV3hz7p0X5935mLQuONMI9+APnM8fy3WPkg==</latexit><latexit sha1_base64="xpl6XVrfMZvjmM458Ptpdn8otuk=">AAAB73icbVDJSgNBEK1xjXGLevTSGAR BDTMi6DHgRfASwSyQjZ5OTdKkp2fs7lHCEPAbvHhQxKu/482/sbMcNPFBweO9Kqrq+bHg2rjut7OwuLS8sppZy65vbG5t53Z2KzpKFMMyi0Skaj7VKLjEsuFGYC1WSENfYNXvX4386gMqzSN5ZwYxNkPalTzgjBor1Xqt 0xPy2Dpu5/JuwR2DzBNvSvIwRamd+2p0IpaEKA0TVOu658ammVJlOBM4zDYSjTFlfdrFuqWShqib6fjeITm0SocEkbIlDRmrvydSGmo9CH3bGVLT07PeSPzPqycmuGymXMaJQckmi4JEEBOR0fOkwxUyIwaWUKa4vZWwH lWUGRtR1obgzb48TypnBc8teLfn+eLN0ySODOzDARyBBxdQhGsoQRkYCHiGV3hz7p0X5935mLQuONMI9+APnM8fy3WPkg==</latexit><latexit sha1_base64="xpl6XVrfMZvjmM458Ptpdn8otuk=">AAAB73icbVDJSgNBEK1xjXGLevTSGAR BDTMi6DHgRfASwSyQjZ5OTdKkp2fs7lHCEPAbvHhQxKu/482/sbMcNPFBweO9Kqrq+bHg2rjut7OwuLS8sppZy65vbG5t53Z2KzpKFMMyi0Skaj7VKLjEsuFGYC1WSENfYNXvX4386gMqzSN5ZwYxNkPalTzgjBor1Xqt 0xPy2Dpu5/JuwR2DzBNvSvIwRamd+2p0IpaEKA0TVOu658ammVJlOBM4zDYSjTFlfdrFuqWShqib6fjeITm0SocEkbIlDRmrvydSGmo9CH3bGVLT07PeSPzPqycmuGymXMaJQckmi4JEEBOR0fOkwxUyIwaWUKa4vZWwH lWUGRtR1obgzb48TypnBc8teLfn+eLN0ySODOzDARyBBxdQhGsoQRkYCHiGV3hz7p0X5935mLQuONMI9+APnM8fy3WPkg==</latexit>
h,w+
<latexit sha1_base64="asUrXQp1PcFTEz0yIg6pi1B1Vm8=">AAAB7XicbVDLSgMxFL2pr1pfVZdugkU QlDIjgi4LbgQ3FewD2rFk0kwbm0mGJKOUoeAnuHGhiFv/x51/Y/pYaPXAhcM593LvPWEiuLGe94VyC4tLyyv51cLa+sbmVnF7p25UqimrUSWUbobEMMElq1luBWsmmpE4FKwRDi7GfuOeacOVvLHDhAUx6UkecUqsk+r9 Y/xwe9QplryyNwH+S/wZKcEM1U7xs91VNI2ZtFQQY1q+l9ggI9pyKtio0E4NSwgdkB5rOSpJzEyQTa4d4QOndHGktCtp8UT9OZGR2JhhHLrOmNi+mffG4n9eK7XReZBxmaSWSTpdFKUCW4XHr+Mu14xaMXSEUM3drZj2i SbUuoAKLgR//uW/pH5S9r2yf31aqlw9TuPIwx7swyH4cAYVuIQq1IDCHTzBC7wihZ7RG3qftubQLMJd+AX08Q2q947z</latexit><latexit sha1_base64="asUrXQp1PcFTEz0yIg6pi1B1Vm8=">AAAB7XicbVDLSgMxFL2pr1pfVZdugkU QlDIjgi4LbgQ3FewD2rFk0kwbm0mGJKOUoeAnuHGhiFv/x51/Y/pYaPXAhcM593LvPWEiuLGe94VyC4tLyyv51cLa+sbmVnF7p25UqimrUSWUbobEMMElq1luBWsmmpE4FKwRDi7GfuOeacOVvLHDhAUx6UkecUqsk+r9 Y/xwe9QplryyNwH+S/wZKcEM1U7xs91VNI2ZtFQQY1q+l9ggI9pyKtio0E4NSwgdkB5rOSpJzEyQTa4d4QOndHGktCtp8UT9OZGR2JhhHLrOmNi+mffG4n9eK7XReZBxmaSWSTpdFKUCW4XHr+Mu14xaMXSEUM3drZj2i SbUuoAKLgR//uW/pH5S9r2yf31aqlw9TuPIwx7swyH4cAYVuIQq1IDCHTzBC7wihZ7RG3qftubQLMJd+AX08Q2q947z</latexit><latexit sha1_base64="asUrXQp1PcFTEz0yIg6pi1B1Vm8=">AAAB7XicbVDLSgMxFL2pr1pfVZdugkU QlDIjgi4LbgQ3FewD2rFk0kwbm0mGJKOUoeAnuHGhiFv/x51/Y/pYaPXAhcM593LvPWEiuLGe94VyC4tLyyv51cLa+sbmVnF7p25UqimrUSWUbobEMMElq1luBWsmmpE4FKwRDi7GfuOeacOVvLHDhAUx6UkecUqsk+r9 Y/xwe9QplryyNwH+S/wZKcEM1U7xs91VNI2ZtFQQY1q+l9ggI9pyKtio0E4NSwgdkB5rOSpJzEyQTa4d4QOndHGktCtp8UT9OZGR2JhhHLrOmNi+mffG4n9eK7XReZBxmaSWSTpdFKUCW4XHr+Mu14xaMXSEUM3drZj2i SbUuoAKLgR//uW/pH5S9r2yf31aqlw9TuPIwx7swyH4cAYVuIQq1IDCHTzBC7wihZ7RG3qftubQLMJd+AX08Q2q947z</latexit><latexit sha1_base64="asUrXQp1PcFTEz0yIg6pi1B1Vm8=">AAAB7XicbVDLSgMxFL2pr1pfVZdugkU QlDIjgi4LbgQ3FewD2rFk0kwbm0mGJKOUoeAnuHGhiFv/x51/Y/pYaPXAhcM593LvPWEiuLGe94VyC4tLyyv51cLa+sbmVnF7p25UqimrUSWUbobEMMElq1luBWsmmpE4FKwRDi7GfuOeacOVvLHDhAUx6UkecUqsk+r9 Y/xwe9QplryyNwH+S/wZKcEM1U7xs91VNI2ZtFQQY1q+l9ggI9pyKtio0E4NSwgdkB5rOSpJzEyQTa4d4QOndHGktCtp8UT9OZGR2JhhHLrOmNi+mffG4n9eK7XReZBxmaSWSTpdFKUCW4XHr+Mu14xaMXSEUM3drZj2i SbUuoAKLgR//uW/pH5S9r2yf31aqlw9TuPIwx7swyH4cAYVuIQq1IDCHTzBC7wihZ7RG3qftubQLMJd+AX08Q2q947z</latexit>
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(b)
Fig. 2: Representations of the 3 × 3 neighborhood and the
three orthogonal planes used for the extraction of the LDP-
TOP descriptors.
through a Savitzky-Golay filter on both dimensions [42].
The initial patch is then tracked over time by shifting it of
∆ frame by frame.
(b) Temporal partition: after conversion to grayscale, over-
lapping temporal windows of d seconds with a stride
of s seconds are isolated. This yields different temporal
sequences of frames, whose numerosity depends on the
duration of the video. A generic temporal sequence S
resulting from this process is a 3D array of pixels of size
H ×W ×K, where H and W depend on the output of
the face detector on the first frame, and K depends on
the frame rate of the video.
(c) Area selection: at this stage, we allow to select a specific
area of the face to be used for the feature analysis, in
order to observe the relevance of different regions for
the chosen feature representation. In our tests, we have
considered three different cases, denoted in the following
with upper-case letters (see Fig. 1): the top-half (T ), the
bottom-half (B), or the full face information (F ) is used.
B. Dynamic texture features
We aim at exploiting both spatial and temporal domains
in the analysis of video sequences. To this purpose, we
considered the Local Derivative Pattern features (LDP), already
used for face recognition as a pattern descriptor (e.g. [24], [6]),
in their extended version involving the temporal domain, the
Local Derivative Pattern on Three Orthogonal Planes (LDP-
TOP) [38].
The LDP, a generalization of the widely used Local Bi-
nary Pattern (LBP), is a point-wise operator applied to 2D
arrays of pixels, that encodes diverse local spatial relation-
ships. As suggested in [6], we consider the second-order
directional LDPs with direction α, indicated as LDP2α, where
α ∈ {0°, 45°, 90°, 135°}. Given a 2D array of pixels A, the
LDP2α at the location (h,w) is an 8-bit vector defined as:
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with h+ := h+1, h− := h−1 and w+ := w+1, w− := w−1.
A representation of the 3×3 neighborhood is depicted in Figure
2(a). The operator I ′α is the first-order derivative in the direction
α, and is defined pixel-wise as:
I ′α(h,w) =

A(h,w)−A(h,w+) if α = 0°
A(h,w)−A(h−, w+) if α = 45°
A(h,w)−A(h−, w) if α = 90°
A(h,w)−A(h−, w−) if α = 135°
(1)
while
f(a, b) =
{
0 if x · y > 0
1 if x · y ≤ 0 (2)
Essentially, LDP2α(h,w) encodes whether first-order deriva-
tives in the direction α have consistent signs when computed
at (h,w) and at proximal pixel locations. For a 2D array, the
LDP2α are extracted for every pixel and their 28-bin histogram
is computed; this is replicated for the four different directions,
and the histograms are concatenated.
Similarly as it is done in [19] for LBPs, in [38] the au-
thors propose to extend the computation of LDP histograms
to 3D arrays. This is done by sequentially considering the
three central 2D arrays along each dimension that intersect
orthogonally (see Figure 2(b)) and again concatenating the
obtained histograms, yielding the so-called LDP-TOP features.
In our case, we apply this procedure to the temporal se-
quences S extracted as in Section III-A, and use the obtained
histograms as features. Considering 4 derivative directions
and three 2D arrays, the feature vector length is equal to
28 × 4× 3 = 3072.
In order to explore potential peculiarities in the way the
temporal information is captured by LDPs, we add the op-
portunity to run the feature extraction on S in three different
temporal modes, which differ by the orientation of the temporal
information. In particular, we define:
• Direct mode (→): S is processed forward along the
temporal direction;
• Inverse mode (←): S is processed backward along the
temporal direction starting from the last frame;
• Bidirectional mode (↔): S is processed in both directions
and histograms are concatenated (thus yielding a feature
vector with doubled size).
IV. Classification framework
We now describe the framework adopted in our study for
training a classifier and taking a decision on single tested
videos.
As depicted in Fig. 3, the training process involves a set of
real and manipulated videos, that we indicate as T Rr (labeled
as 0) and T Rm (labeled as 1), respectively. Every video in
these sets is fed into the pre-processing and the descriptor
computation blocks, as described in Sections III-A and III-B.
The feature vectors computed from each temporal sequences
inherit the label of the video they belong and all of them are
used as inputs for training the classifier C, a Support Vector
Machines (SVM) with linear kernel2.
Afterwards, the videos to be tested belong to sets that we will
indicate as T S r and T Sm. The prediction on single videos is
computed as depicted in Fig. 4. Pre-processing and descriptor
computation are again performed and each resulting feature
vector extracted is passed to the trained SVM model. This
returns a pair pn, sn for each of the N temporal sequences
extracted, where pn is the predicted label and sn is the output
score of the SVM. In order to determine a final label pˆ for the
input video, a majority voting criterion is employed:
pˆ = maj({p1, . . . , pN}) (3)
where maj(·) outputs the value recurring most frequently in the
input set. In case of equal number of conflicting predictions,
the maj criterion conservatively favors the 0 class.
Finally, for each video we compute a final score sˆ through
a “reduced mean” criterion:
sˆ = mean({sn where n is such that pn = pˆ}), (4)
i.e., only the score values corresponding to the sequences
whose predictions correspond to the final prediction pˆ are
averaged.
V. Experimental results
The next sections present the experimental tests conducted
in order to validate the proposed method in practical scenarios.
As a benchmark dataset of real and fake videos, we con-
sidered the FaceForensics++ dataset described in [40], which
consists of a large set of videos depicting human faces, which
are then manipulated with different techniques. In particular,
we have considered the 1000 original videos (OR) and their
manipulated counterparts through the Deepfake (DF) [1], the
Face2Face (F2F) [45] and the FaceSwap (FSW) [2] techniques.
We operate on the version of the dataset subject to a light
compression (H.264 with constant rate quantization parameter
equal to 23). An example of these different manipulations is
depicted in Fig. 5. The videos are recorded under different
conditions (e.g., interviews, TV shows, etc.), they have different
length and are captured by different cameras. This results
into a huge variability in terms of both data content and
video structure (i.e., frame rate, video length, original coding
standards, etc).
The dataset comes with a standard split of videos for
training, validation, and testing. In order to enable a fair
comparison with other recently proposed approaches, we also
considered the same training and testing set, yielding the sets
T RD with |T RD| = 720 and T SD with |T SD| = 140, where
D ∈ {OR,DF, F2F, FSW}. Different subsets will be combined
according to the experimental scenario considered.
2We used the MATLAB Statistics and Machine Learning Toolbox (v. R2019a)
and selected a linear kernel function with predictor data standardization and
Sequential Minimal Optimization (SMO).
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Fig. 4: Testing Pipeline: the pipeline C returns a binary label pˆ and the corresponding score sˆ.
We have tested the feature representation and classification
framework proposed in Section III and IV in several experi-
mental scenarios and by analyzing different factors, which are
described in details in the next subsections. For the sake
of readability, we first summarize here the structure of our
experimental validations:
• Single-technique scenario (Section V-A). Original and
fake videos are considered separately for different creation
techniques; the impact of the temporal partition operation,
the face area selection, and the temporal mode adopted
are discussed.
• Multiple-technique scenario (Section V-B). Videos cre-
ated with arbitrary manipulation techniques are mixed in
the testing; the capabilities of detecting and identifying
Fig. 5: Frames extracted from (a) a sample OR video sequence
and its (b) DF, (c) F2F and (d) FSW manipulated versions.
the manipulation technique used in the testing phase is
evaluated.
• Strong video compression (Section V-C). The proposed
detector is tested when a heavier compression is applied
to the videos, thus its robustness against video compres-
sion is analyzed.
• Comparison with other descriptors (Section V-D).
Performance comparison is discussed both considering
the proposed detector exploiting the alternative spatio-
temporal feature representation given by the LBP-TOP and
other SoA approaches.
A. Single-technique scenario
We tested the performance of our approach in separating
original videos from videos that have been manipulated with a
specific technique. The goal is to show the capabilities of each
classifier when subjected to its corresponding test set. Thus:
T Rr = T ROR T Rm = T RD
T S r = T SOR T Sm = T SD
where D varies in the set {DF, F2F, FSW}. This yields an SVM
classifier for every manipulation technique, that we denote as
CDF, CF2F and CFSW.
Videos in these sets are fed into the training pipeline
described in Fig. 3. In this phase, we report the results obtained
by employing the three different facial areas (F , T , and B)
specified in Section III-A and the three temporal modes (→,←,
6Fig. 6: Classification accuracy per manipulation technique.
TABLE I: Classification accuracy and AUC computed on the single-manipulation scenario. Different facial areas and temporal
modes are considered.
Accuracy AverageAccuracy AUC
Average
AUC
Algorithm
Version Deepfakes Face2Face FaceSwap Cross-Dataset Deepfakes Face2Face FaceSwap Cross-Dataset
(F,→) 93,57% 82,86% 93,57% 90,00% 98,23% 88,08% 98,22% 94,85%
(F,←) 93,57% 77,14% 90,71% 87,14% 98,78% 85,14% 98,00% 93,97%
(F,↔) 94,29% 79,29% 90,71% 88,10% 98,65% 86,94% 97,45% 94,35%
(T,→) 91,43% 76,43% 92,86% 86,90% 95,39% 78,13% 98,18% 90,57%
(T,←) 92,14% 75,71% 92,14% 86,67% 94,41% 78,39% 98,00% 90,27%
(T,↔) 90,71% 73,57% 93,57% 85,95% 94,89% 80,78% 98,06% 91,24%
(B,→) 93,57% 82,14% 92,14% 89,29% 97,53% 86,64% 97,47% 93,88%
(B,←) 92,86% 81,43% 89,29% 87,86% 97,57% 85,91% 97,55% 93,68%
(B,↔) 93,57% 85,00% 92,14% 90,24% 97,55% 88,63% 97,47% 94,55%
and↔) specified in Section III-B, yielding to nine classifiers per
manipulation technique, to observe how they vary and interact.
Results are depicted as bar plots in Figure 6 in terms of
accuracy, i.e., the fraction of videos in T S r ∪ T Sm that is
assigned to the correct label. Full numerical results are reported
in Table I, where the value of the Area Under the Curve (AUC)
obtained by thresholding sˆ (i.e., the reduced-mean score) is
also reported as performance indicator.
Tab. I suggests that CDF and CFSW almost always allow for
an accuracy greater that 90%, while for CF2F the accuracy
does not exceeds 85, 0%. Interestingly, this correlates with the
observations made in [40], where a user study reveals that
F2F generally produces more challenging manipulations to be
detected for humans.
Moreover, it can be noticed that both the F and the B facial
areas versions provide a better accuracy with respect to T . This
indicates that the artifacts captured by the proposed feature
representation are generally concentrated in the bottom part of
the face. However, this effect is not uniform across manipulation
techniques (see FSW), suggesting that manipulation-specific
patterns are likely introduced, as we will exploit in the next
subsection.
Finally, we observe that the inverse temporal mode alone
does not introduce significant advantages, while the bidirec-
tional mode generally does. This is not so suprising, given
that the feature vector size is doubled, however the number of
training samples remains the same.
In summary, the best results in terms of both performance
indicators are achieved in the (F,→) and the (B,↔) cases,
respectively yielding 90, 00% and 90, 24% average accuracy.
Therefore, for the sake of readability and space, we focus on
the corresponding classifiers for the experimental analyses in
the next subsections.
As a further analysis, we evaluate the benefits of applying
the temporal partition through sliding windows in the prepro-
cessing phase by comparing with the baseline case where
videos are not subdivided in shorter video sequences (i.e.,
the w parameter in Fig. 1 is set equal to the video length in
seconds) and only one LDP-TOP feature vector is extracted
from each single video. This corresponds to the common
approach of previously proposed detection methods (see [40]).
First, we observe in Table II how the number of input feature
vectors changes for these two cases, noticing that the sliding
window approach increases the number of training/testing
feature vectors by 6 to 8 times. Then, we provide in Table
III the accuracy loss when skipping the temporal partition
step, defined as the difference in accuracy between of the
“sliding” and “non-sliding” case (i.e., positive values indicate
better performance of the “sliding” case). It can be noticed that
the “sliding” approach always outperforms the “non-sliding” in
7TABLE II: Comparison between the number of samples
(batches) obtained in case of non-sliding and sliding window
approaches.
OR DF F2F FSW
Training Testing Training Testing Training Testing Training Testing
Sliding 3029 588 3026 588 2966 640 2307 482
Non-sliding 360 70 360 70 360 70 360 70
TABLE III: Classification accuracy loss per manipulation tech-
nique when applying the "non-sliding" approach.
Accuracy Loss AverageAccuracy Loss
Algorithm
Version DF F2F FSW Cross-Dataset
(F,→) 1,43% 10,72% -2,14% 3,33%
(F,←) 2,14% 5,71% -2,15% 1,90%
(F,↔) 2,15% 6,43% -4,29% 1,43%
(T,→) 2,14% 10,00% 0,00% 4,04%
(T,←) 2,14% 3,57% 0,00% 1,91%
(T,↔) 1,42% -1,43% 2,14% 0,71%
(B,→) -0,72% 3,57% 0,00% 0,96%
(B,←) 0,00% 5,72% -2,85% 0,96%
(B,↔) 1,43% 7,14% 0,00% 2,86%
terms of average accuracy among all datasets, with significant
improvements (up to 10%) for F2F. Just in some single cases,
especially for FSW, this observation is reversed, showing again
manipulation-specific peculiarities. The two selected classifiers
(top and bottom one in Table III) however adhere to the general
trend, showing an average accuracy increase of 3, 33% and of
2, 86%.
B. Multiple-technique scenario
We now consider the case where manipulation techniques
are mixed. In particular, we approach the more realistic case
where
T S r = T SOR T Sm = T SDF ∪ T SF2F ∪ T SFSW
and the binary decision on each testing video needs to be
taken blindly, i.e., without prior information on the manipulation
technique used.
We have experienced that training a single binary classifier
with T Rr = T ROR and T Rm = T RDF ∪ T RF2F ∪ T RFSW
brings to poor results. This might be interpreted in view of
the linearity of the classifier used, which seemingly does
not allow to properly separate the two classes through an
hyperplane in the feature space. Instead of enforcing that a
single classifier can accurately separate the samples, we rather
propose to combine the outcome of classifiers trained on single
manipulation techniques. This also allows us to estimate the
used manipulation technique in case of positive detection in a
cascade fashion as represented in Figure 7.
More specifically, we propose to assign each test video a
label pˆ ∈ {0, 1} by combining the outputs of the classifiers CDF,
CF2F and CFSW trained as in Section V-A. This yields to three
predicted labels pˆDF, pˆF2F, pˆFSW, and three average scores sˆDF,
sˆF2F, sˆFSW. Then, the three estimated labels are passed to a
fusion block that applies the logical OR operator (indicated as
∨) in order to get pˆ. In other words, a video is classified as
manipulated as soon as one of the three detectors returns
the label 1. Furthermore, in case of pˆ = 1, the maximum
value of the scores is selected as indicator of the manipulation
technique used to create the video.
Table IV reports the accuracy results obtained through this
approach for the two variants selected in Section V-A, (F,→)
and (B,↔), which consistently exceed 85%. We also report
the false positive rate (fraction of original videos erroneously
classified as manipulated) and the false negative rate (fraction
of manipulated videos erroneously classified as original). The
former seems to be more crucial for this fused approach, likely
due to the fact that original videos are underrepresented in the
overall training set.
Finally, we measure the accuracy in estimating the manip-
ulation technique used when a video is correctly classified
as manipulated. Table V and Table VI are the confusion
matrices of the two classifiers for this task. The high diagonal
values (around 90, 00% in most cases) indicate that the feature
representation carries quite strong information on the specific
manipulations techniques.
C. Impact of Strong Video Compression
The FaceForensics++ dataset also offers a more heavily
compressed version of the videos, i.e., with cf = 40. As
reported in [40], the quality degradation due to compression
compromises the performance of detection algorithms, as well
as humans. We therefore assess how this impacts our method
by reproducing the single-technique scenario for the two best
performing classifiers, and report the results in Figure 8 and
Table VII. While keeping an average accuracy around 70%, the
performance decrease is evident when compared to Figure 6
(around 20%), thus confirming that, as most of the existing
methods, our feature representation also suffers from the
TABLE IV: Classification results in the multiple-technique sce-
nario.
Algorithm
Version
False
Positive
Rate
False
Negative
Rate
Accuracy
(F,→) 20,00% 11,43% 86,43%
(B,↔) 15,71% 11,90% 87,14%
TABLE V: Confusion matrix for the manipulation estimation task
with (F,→).
PREDICTIONS
DF F2F FSW
DF 89,23 10,77% 0,00%
F2F 5,17% 91,38% 3,45%
TA
R
G
ET
FSW 0,00% 3,17% 96,83%
TABLE VI: Confusion matrix for the manipulation estimation
task with (B,↔).
PREDICTIONS
DF F2F FSW
DF 83,33 16,17% 0,00%
F2F 5,08% 91,53% 3,39%
TA
R
G
ET
FSW 0,00% 5,00% 95,00%
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Fig. 7: Decision pipeline for the multiple-technique scenario.
Fig. 8: Classification accuracy per manipulation technique in case of strong video compression.
TABLE VII: Classification accuracy and AUC computed on the single-manipulation scenario in case of strong video compression.
Accuracy AverageAccuracy AUC
Average
AUC
Algorithm
Version Deepfakes Face2Face FaceSwap Cross-Dataset Deepfakes Face2Face FaceSwap Cross-Dataset
(F,→) 74,29% 62,14% 72,86% 69,76% 80,49% 68,97% 80,59% 76,68%
(B,↔) 77,14% 69,29% 68,57% 71,67% 81,35% 74,04% 79,64% 78,34%
TABLE VIII: Classification accuracy in the multiple-technique
scenario in case of strong video compression.
Algorithm
Version
Decision
Criterion
False
Positive
Rate
False
Negative
Rate
Accuracy
(F,→) ∨ 50,00% 27,62% 66,79%
(B,↔) ∨ 42,86% 23,81% 71,43%
application of a heavier compression. This holds also for the
multiple-technique scenario, where the accuracy of the best
classifier drop to 71% (see Table VIII).
D. Comparison with other descriptors
In this subsection, we consider the performance of our
method with respect to other detection algorithms.
We first compare our feature representation with a known
competitor among the spatio-temporal texture descriptors used
in face anti-spoofing, the LBP-TOP [54]. Differently from LDPs,
LBPs capture only information on the first-order directional
derivatives computed at a central reference pixel, that are
thresholded, encoded into a binary number, and finally col-
lected into histogram over different pixels; LBP-TOP is the
corresponding temporal extension and yields a feature vector
of length [1, 177], obtained by applying the uniform pattern
version of the LBP features that led to a more compact feature
vector and descriptor robust to rotations. We want to determine
whether and how much the improved performance observed
in [38] for the face spoofing detection task generalizes to
the detection of facial manipulations. To this purpose, the
tests performed in Section V-A are extended by replacing the
LDP-TOP feature vector with the LBP-TOP one, while keeping
unchanged all the other steps described in Sections III and IV.
We report in Fig. 9 the classification accuracy loss observed
when using LBP-TOP instead of LDP-TOP (i.e., with respect to
the results in Figure 6). The loss is always positive, thus LDP-
TOP indeed outperforms LBP-TOP by a significant margin.
Then, we position our results with respect to other methods
proposed in literature and benchmarked on the same dataset
in [40]. Since the training, validation, and testing splits of the
9Fig. 9: Classification accuracy loss per manipulation technique when using LBP-TOP descriptors instead of the proposed ones.
Fig. 10: Classification accuracies of the proposed algorithms with respect to other detection methods. Orange background
indicates that the method is based on CNNs.
FaceForensics++ dataset are standard, it is fair to compare the
results obtained through our proposed pipelines with the ones
reported in [40] in terms of accuracy on the testing set. Figure
10 reports the results of our (F,→) and (B,↔) classifiers and
other six detection methods, namely “Steg+SVM” [20], “Coz-
zolino et al.” [14], “Rahmouni et al.” [39], “Bayar and Stamm” [7],
“MesoNet” [3], and “XceptionNet” [40], sorted according to their
average accuracy over manipulation techniques. All of them,
except for the “Steg+SVM”, are based on convolutional neural
networks. Remarkably, our approach outperforms the SVM-
based one [20] by a large margin, and also two techniques
based on CNNs [14] and [39]. While the performance of other
deep networks like XceptionNet remains significantly better,
the proposed spatio-temporal descriptors, separated linearly
in the feature space, provide fairly accurate results with the
advantages of higher explainability of the encoded patterns
and limited training time.
VI. Conclusions
In this paper we have proposed a novel methodology to
detect fake video sequences by exploiting spatio-temporal
descriptors successfully exploited for the task of face anti-
spoofing. Results show good performance on various ma-
nipulation techniques and in different experimental scenarios.
Relatively small feature representation and relatively simple
10
classifiers allow to detect manipulated video sequences and
identify the adopted manipulation technique.
Future work will deal with the challenging problem of heavy
video compression, where current literature still does not
achieve satisfactory results. Moreover, further extension will
consider the scenario where new manipulation techniques
could be considered and learned by the detector, e.g. by
exploiting innovative paradigms coming from the machine
learning domain like incremental learning.
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